The main objective of this paper is to investigate
the way subsidization mechanisms affect the cost efficiency of public
transit systems, taking into account the role played by the environmental
characteristics of each network. To this end, a cost frontier model
is estimated for a seven-year (1993-1999) panel of 45 Italian transit
companies run under two different regulatory schemes (cost-plus or
fixed-price), using the methodology proposed by Battese and Coelli
(1995). The main evidence is that, given network characteristics,
transit operators with high-powered incentive contracts (fixed-price
subsidies) exhibit lower distortions from minimum costs. Environmental
conditions (network speed levels) also have a significant impact on
inefficiency differentials. Overall, these results highlight a scope
for transport policy to increase X-efficiency. Furthermore, they confirm
the importance of incentive theory and modern regulatory economics
for the production analysis of regulated utilities.